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Summary

Many Americans donate little or nothing to charity, but according to Robert Cooter
and Brian Broughman, our social environment is the cause, not human nature. They
propose a small policy change to increase transparency and elicit generosity inspired by
experimental evidence about the nature of giving.
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In 1997 Vice President Al Gore and his wife gave $353 to charity from
income of $197,729, or 0.2 percent of income. The mean contribution in their
income bracket is ten times higher or 2.0 percent.
Commentators groaned that the Gores ought to set a better example.
Americans need it. Recent polls show that approximately 30 percent of American
households, including many with high incomes, donate nothing. Most people
who do contribute give less than one percent of their annual income, despite
religious and cultural traditions that require much more.
These facts seem to confirm the standard economic assumption that people
are narrowly self-interested. Experimental evidence, however, shows that people
behave generously in the right circumstances. Instead of being inalterable traits,
generosity and stinginess respond to the social environment. Unfortunately, our
system of anonymous charity stifles generosity.
After public criticism, the Gore family increased its charitable giving the
next year from 0.2 to 6.8 percent of income. The fact that the Gores disclosed
their charitable contributions, however, is unusual. Most people keep such
information private. Although few Americans are under the level of public
scrutiny that the Gores were, many Americans would be more generous if other
people observed their level of giving.
The state is well placed to give the missing information to the public.
Taxpayers should be able to disclose information from their tax returns.
Specifically, taxpayers should be able to direct the IRS to post to the Internet their
ratio of charitable contributions to income. Disclosure on the “donation registry”
would be voluntary as a matter of law, but subject to social pressure. If the state
enables disclosure, social norms will do the rest and donations will increase
dramatically.

The Nonprofit Sector
In 2003 nonprofits received over $240 billion in private donations, and
over 18 billion hours of volunteer labor. Combining donations with sales of
goods and government grants, nonprofit organizations account for nearly six
percent of U.S. national income. The nonprofit sector provides a broad range of
social goods, including poverty relief, education, medical services, scientific
research, art, and religion.

Brought to you by | Indiana University School of Law
Authenticated | 129.79.132.117
Download Date | 1/2/13 5:02 PM

The Economists' Voice

2

Vol. 2 [2005], No. 3, Article 4

In supplying social goods, charities have several advantages over the state.
First, being voluntary, donations distort incentives less than taxes. Second, being
focused, many donors monitor performance of charities, rewarding good
performance and punishing bad performance. Third, the state’s majoritarian
politics fails to supply the mix of social goods required by a diverse population.
According to Burton Weisbrod, an economist at Northwestern University, as the
population of a democracy diversifies, charities should expand and fill gaps in the
state’s supply of social goods.

Charity’s Problem: Publicity
Given its importance, economists should develop mechanisms to increase
charitable giving. Instead of tax deductions, which are the typical prescription,
economists should take inspiration from behavioral experiments that link charity
to information. In a typical public goods experiment a group of four or more
subjects receive “tokens” for money. A subject can either keep her entire
allocation of tokens or contribute some to a public good that is shared with the
other players. In the usual experimental design, the group’s payoff is maximized
when each subject contributes all her tokens to the public good, but contributing
nothing and free riding maximizes the individual’s payoff. A narrowly selfinterested player will keep all of her tokens, while an altruistic person will
contribute to the public good.
The results of these experiments reveal principles of charitable giving.
First, when an individual’s contribution is anonymous and unobservable by other
participants or the experimenter, she will make a significantly smaller
contribution than when others can observe her behavior. Anonymity stifles
generosity, while publicity encourages it.
Second, subjects contribute less when they are unable to communicate.
Isaac and Walker gave subjects the opportunity to talk with each other before
deciding how much to contribute. The other participants could not observe the
actual investment by each subject. Still, conversation increased contributions.
Communication reinforces a norm of cooperation.
Third, contributions are higher if subjects can punish free riders. In a
public goods experiment, Fehr and Gächter let players observe the contribution of
each participant. Based on this observation, subjects could punish a participant by
reducing her payoff. Doing so, however, costs the punisher and was not in her
self-interest. Regardless, the mere threat of punishment increases contribution
levels.
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Applying these results, the social environment of the U.S is ideal to elicit
stinginess. First, donations are often anonymously made from the privacy of
one’s home. Charities, who understand the importance of publicity, publish lists
of donors by contribution level and use fundraising events to increase visibility.
Yet these charities do not know a person’s total giving to all charities. Except for
some public officials like Al Gore, the level of total giving by each individual is
unknown.
Second, few Americans discuss their donations with each other. If people
discussed their donations concretely, they would reach more agreement over
whether, say, three percent is enough or too little. For a clear standard of civic
obligation to emerge, discussions of charity must move from the abstract to the
concrete.
Third, because we cannot identify them, free riders escape social
sanctions. This problem especially afflicts obligations that are “disjunctive”
rather than “conjunctive.” To illustrate the difference, we are obligated to make a
donation to “A or B or C or ….” In contrast, the duty not to lie or cheat or steal
applies to “A and B and C and ….” Whether instances of the obligation are linked
by “or” or “and” affects free-riding. Establishing violations of a conjunctive
obligation requires a single observation. In contrast, detecting a violation of a
disjunctive obligation requires aggregate information. To illustrate concretely, a
university might disclose individual donations in its alumni magazine. We cannot
conclude, however, that an unlisted alumnus is uncharitable, because he may have
donated generously to another cause.
For disjunctive obligations, preventing
free-riding requires aggregate information, which in turn requires some
centralization of information.
Available data in the U.S. and other countries confirms the dismal
predictions suggested by these facts about charitable contributions. Using IRS
data, Figure 1 shows the average ratio of contributions to income for itemizing
taxpayers. The average itemizer donated 3.2 percent of annual income. While
extensive, the data in Figure 1 is biased, because approximately 65 percent of
taxpayers do not itemize. Non-itemizers typically donate a smaller portion of their
income, causing Figure 1 to overstate contributions. The average non-itemizer
donated 1.5 percent of annual income.
Average behavior is not typical behavior. As figure 2 demonstrates, the
median contribution is less than one percent, and almost a third of the population
gives nothing.
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Figure 1: Contribution Ratios from 2001 Tax Returns
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Figure 2: Distribution of Household Contribution Levels in 1998
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According to Figure 1, low-income itemizers donate a significantly higher
proportion of income than high-income itemizers, but this fact is misleading.
Unlike high-income taxpayers, most low-income taxpayers do not itemize and
those who do have exceptionally large contributions. This fact presumably
explains away the regressivity in Figure 1. When non-itemizers are included, a
flat contribution ratio of approximately two percent is a reasonable estimate for all
but the wealthiest Americans. Very wealthy households, those with income over
$10 million, contribute a significantly higher ratio.
Surveys also show that religious people donate more money and time to
charities than non-religious people. Some religious organizations like the
Mormons create an ideal environment to trigger generosity and they induce many
members to tithe (give 10%).

The Solution: The Donation Registry
To increase donations, we propose that nonprofit organizations work with
the IRS to create a donation registry on the Internet. The registry would publish
the ratio of a person’s contributions to annual income, while keeping private the
person’s absolute contributions and income. Specifically, the IRS could add an
optional box to the tax form authorizing disclosure. Disclosure would be
voluntary. If the box is checked the IRS would automatically transmit to the
donation registry the taxpayer’s name and her ratio of deductible contributions to
adjusted gross income for the year. A typical entry on the registry would look
like this:
Tax Year

Name

Contribution Ratio

2004

John Doe

5%

Would anyone volunteer to be listed? No doubt, some people may be
reluctant to disclose out of modesty or a desire for financial privacy. To overcome
reluctance, charities should apply social pressure to public figures such as
politicians, business leaders, sports heroes, and actors. Charities should emphasize
that disclosure demonstrates civic responsibility and encourages others. Like Al
Gore, public figures who do not disclose or give too little should be shamed. After
public figures start to disclose, we envision a gradual spread to most taxpayers
who itemize. Organizations should aim for participation by their members in the
donation registry much like they currently aim for participation in the United
Way.
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Economic theory provides another reason why people would voluntarily
list themselves. Those with high contributions will tend to list themselves,
whereas those with low contributions will be reluctant to list themselves. Thus a
failure to list oneself will allow others to guess that one has low contributions.
This fact may unravel the group that refuses and cause almost everyone to list
themselves. In fact, this experiment was recently conducted in our law school
with regard to teaching ratings. Just as the theory predicts, all but one teacher
chose to list his or her ratings.
Behavioral studies find that contribution levels are twice as high when
donations can be observed as compared to complete anonymity. The donation
registry should significantly increase donations, possibly doubling them. Even a
modest increase in the average donation will significantly increase funding for
social goods. For example, if the mean contribution ratio were increased by half
of one percent (from 2.1 to 2.6 percent) this would result in approximately $50
billion in additional revenue for charitable organizations.

Refinements and Extensions
Alternate methods could be used alongside the registry to encourage
donations. For instance the IRS could send a ‘challenge letter’ to each taxpayer
who did not disclose over the registry. The challenge letter would compare the
individual’s donations to the contributions of others in the same income bracket.
Our concept can also encompass volunteering. For example, the
American Bar Association recommends that lawyers perform at least 50 hours of
volunteer legal services for clients of limited financial means each year. A
volunteer registry could publicize pro bono work by lawyers or by law firms. The
‘pro bono registry’ would disclose which lawyers (and which firms) actually live
up to the ABA standard, and would use publicity to encourage higher levels of
volunteering. In fact, some states have adopted pro bono reporting requirements.
In Florida, for instance, lawyers are required to report each year whether or not
they have performed pro bono service or, alternatively, provided direct financial
support to nonprofit legal service providers. According to Talbot D’Alemberte,
former president of the American Bar Association, Florida’s reporting program
has significantly increased volunteering and monetary contributions by its
lawyers. Doctors, accountants, and many other groups could establish similar
volunteer registries.
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Conclusion
Conservatives and liberals often share the belief that more social goods
require higher taxes. They are wrong. More donations could finance more social
goods without increasing taxes or expanding state bureaucracy. Economists
should use experimental findings to design policies that elicit more donations to
pay for more social goods. The first requirement is to publicize donations by
individuals. For this purpose, the IRS should add a check box on income tax
forms for the taxpayer to consent to publishing the ratio of contributions to
adjusted gross income. The donation registry would make the contribution ratio of
individuals observable to the public, provoke concrete discussion about charitable
obligations, and facilitate social sanctions for shirkers. The aim is to develop a
civic standard of responsible giving to supplement the religious standards of
particular faiths. With a little state action, social norms will do the rest.

Robert Cooter is the Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law, and Director of the
Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy at Boalt Hall School of Law
at the University of California Berkeley. He is a founder and past president of the
American Law and Economics Association, and in 1999 was elected to the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Brian Broughman is a graduate student in the department of Jurisprudence and
Social Policy at the University of California Berkeley.
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